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IElite Investments in Party Institutionalization in New
Democracies: A Two-Dimensional Approach
Nicole Bolleyer, University of Exeter
Saskia P. Ruth, German Institute of Global and Area StudiesThis article conceptualizes party institutionalization and theorizes the conditions under which party elites invest in
institutionalized parties in new democracies. We specify routinization and value infusion as two central dimensions of
party institutionalization and theorize conditions relevant for party institutionalization across three central spheres: the
party system, the state, and society. Constructing measures for routinization and value infusion based on expert survey
data, we test our framework through multivariate regression models across parties in 18 Latin American democracies.
As theoretically expected, some conditions (access to executive ofﬁce, a party’s formative environment, and group ties)
signiﬁcantly relate to both dimensions, while others (party system polarization and fragmentation, permanent state
subsidies, and legislative ofﬁce) relate to one dimension only. This highlights the multidimensionality of party insti-
tutionalization as a phenomenon and the complexity of the empirical conditions associated with it.n a widely cited review article on political parties in Latin
America, Levitsky urged us more than 10 years ago to de-
velop more nuanced conceptual frameworks that differen-
tiate various dimensions of parties as organizations, conced-
ing that such efforts are seriously constrained by a lack of data
(2001a, 106–7). Reﬂecting this difﬁculty, most of the litera-
ture to date has focused either on in-depth qualitative studies
of a single or a few cases at the party level or, alternatively, on
the cross-national study of party system institutionalization
at the country level. In contrast, this article conceptualizes and
empirically explores the diversity of party institutionalization,
an important party property in both new and established de-
mocracies.
According to Levitsky (1998) as well as Randall and Svå-
sand (2002), party institutionalization—a party’s development
toward consolidation—becomes manifest in two distinct in-
ternal properties: routinization, a structural dimension that
refers to rule-guided processes between a party and its fol-Nicole Bolleyer (N.Bolleyer@exeter.ac.uk) is professor of comparative politics, D
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1. Many comparative studies use, for instance, party age as a proxy for party
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to followers’ emotional afﬁliation to their party. While party
institutionalization “is not identical with the party’s develop-
ment in purely organisational terms” (Randall and Svåsand
2002, 12), structures and practices party elites decide to invest
in can be either conducive or detrimental to institutionalized
relationships between followers and their party (Panebianco
1988, 53–65). This is important as routinization and value
infusion are notoriously difﬁcult to capture directly.1 To mea-
sure the mechanisms and practices party elites choose to build
their own party allows us to capture empirically whether in-
vestments in each dimension of party institutionalization have
been made or not. Using data from the Democratic Account-
ability and Linkages Project (DALP; Kitschelt et al. 2009) to
construct such measures provides us with nuanced proxies for
each dimension. This, in turn, allows us to examine which
conditions are conducive to routinization and value infusion
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a puzzle as parties are often born “in the state” rather than
formed on the basis of strong societal ties as in old democracies
(Levitsky, Loxton, andVanDyck 2016; van Biezen 2005). They
operate in contexts characterized by high levels of political
uncertainty, which is bound to alter fundamentally the con-
siderations of elites regarding the type of party base to build
and might lead to a prioritization of ﬂexibility, in turn con-
ducive to low institutionalization levels (Lupu and Riedl 2013,
1349). It has been argued that in new democracies, creating
a permanent anchoring in society is time-consuming, labor-
intensive, and chosen only if no other option is available to
build up support (van Biezen 2005, 155). Yet if this is so,
why do we ﬁnd considerable diversity among parties in, for
instance, Latin American democracies, with some parties being
highly institutionalized, such as the Workers’ Party (PT) in
Brazil or the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mex-
ico, while others have remained weakly institutionalized in
the long term such as the Ecuadorian Roldosista Party (PRE)
and the Radical and Social Democratic Party (PRSD) in Chile?
Generally speaking, why should party elites consider costly in-
vestments in a routinized and value-infused party base worth-
while in highly uncertain environments that incentivize elec-
toral, “catchall” strategies and ﬂexible, weakly institutionalized
parties (Gunther and Hopkin 2009; Kirchheimer 1966; Lupu
and Riedl 2013; Tavits 2013)?
Studying party institutionalization is particularly impor-
tant in new democracies since stable parties can be crucial for
the viability and functioning of democracy (see, among others,
Svåsand [2013] and Tavits [2013]). Institutionalized parties
tend to be more ﬁrmly anchored in society, helping parties to
overcome collective action problems, allowing for the effec-
tive channeling of preferences from citizens to party elites em-
bedded in democratic institutions. Party institutionalization
can thereby stabilize patterns of party competition and is thus
relevant to party system institutionalization, a central element
in assuring politicians’ electoral accountability to citizens.2
While we focus on the party level, our study nonetheless
contributes to the reﬁned measurement of party system in-
stitutionalization as a multidimensional concept. To measure2. Party system institutionalization is deﬁned by four dimensions: the
stability of the rules of competition, the legitimacy of the party system, the
stability of parties’ roots in society, and the strength of party structures. Roots
in society have so far been operationalized through indicators as diverse as
party age or ideological party-voter linkage; the strength of party organiza-
tion usually is left aside. See Luna (2014), Mainwaring and Scully (1995),
Mainwaring and Torcal (2006), and Sanchez (2008). See Casal Bértoa (2016)
on the distinction between party institutionalization and party system insti-
tutionalization.institutionalization on the party level is relevant to two of the
four conceptual dimensions of party system institutionaliza-
tion (Luna 2014, 406–7): the rootedness of parties in society
suggesting stable ties between parties and followers (echoing
the concept of value infusion) and the extent to which party
infrastructures are well developed and stabilize relationships
with followers (echoing the concept of routinization).
Especially in the Latin American context, relatively little is
known about the conditions under which party elites invest in
institutionalization, which is problematic since the region’s
much studied “crisis of representation” has been closely linked
to the decline of traditional political parties as well as the decay
of entire party systems (e.g., Sanchez 2008). To be able to ex-
amine the various consequences of different patterns of party
institutionalization, the nature of parties as complex organi-
zations (Wills-Otero 2016, 759) needs to be conceptualized
and mapped out ﬁrst, which is one major aim of this article.
After introducing our two-dimensional conceptualiza-
tion of party institutionalization in the following section,
we theorize conditions—related to party system character-
istics, the nature of party-state, and party-society relations—
that incentivize party elites in new democracies to invest in
either routinization, value infusion, or both. While our hy-
potheses theorize conditions relevant to party building in
new democracies generally, we apply them to parties across
18 Latin American democracies. Estimating multivariate re-
gression models, we show that routinization and value infu-
sion do not always go together, nor are they necessarily more
likely to be present under the same conditions. We conclude
with a discussion of the broader implications of our ﬁndings
for the study of political parties in new democracies more
generally.
CONCEPTUALIZING PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION
Party institutionalization (hereafter PI) captures a party’s
development toward consolidation. Focusing on the condi-
tions under which elites incentivize the formation of an in-
stitutionalized party base, we start out from Panebianco’s
seminal book (1988). Building on his contribution, con-
ceptual work on parties’ internal life has distinguished two
dimensions of institutionalization: routinization and value
infusion. The routinization of a party’s relationship to its
followers takes place when processes within it become more
rule-guided and regularized. This becomes visible in an in-
creasingly elaborate and stable infrastructure (Panebianco
1988, 49, 53), conducive to organizational rules becoming
“perceived as permanent structures” (Levitsky 1998, 81) and
to parties as structures being increasingly dense, regularized,
and thus able to guide followers’ behavior (Janda 1980).3
Importantly, the presence of permanent structures as a factor
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creation of formal party branches in the traditional (western
European) sense. It equally can be assured by networks of local
intermediaries (Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006; Kitschelt and
Kselman 2010). In this sense, permanence does not presup-
pose one particular “organizational form” but refers to struc-
tures (formal or informal) that guide the behavior of follow-
ers who interact within them and thereby create continuity
between elections. These structures support base-level rou-
tinization because formal party branches as well as informal
networks incorporate followers into the party (Freidenberg
and Levitsky 2006; Kitschelt and Kselman 2010, 13–14). They
provide channels for communication between party and grass-
roots (Levitsky 2001b, 54–56; Tavits 2013), with party ofﬁcials
forming part of these structures who “establish routines and
standard operating procedures” (Kitschelt 1994, 222), thereby
familiarizing followers with rules and procedures that govern
the internal life of a party.
While also characterizing the relationship between party
and followers, value infusion is not a structural feature. It shows
when followers start caring about the survival of their party as
such, rather than seeing it as a mere instrument to achieve a set
of goals (Janda 1980, 19; Levitsky 1998, 82). Wilson (1973) as
well as Panebianco (1988) have stressed that most organiza-
tions will try to combine the provision of different incentives to
followers to stabilize voluntary support, which parties contin-
uously depend on, since followers are free to leave. That said,
Panebianco associates value infusion especially with nonma-
terial collective incentives such as party identiﬁcation linked to
a particular cause or to social and political goals shared by fol-
lowers (10–11). Similarly, the provision of such incentives can
be generated by leaders embodying core party values (Pedah-
zur and Brichta 2002, 40; Rosenblatt 2013).4 While selective
incentives are important to motivate ambitious elites, non-
material incentives provided to followers generate noninstru-3. Note that we distinguish base-level routinization (through which
followers are socialized into party rules) from constraints on leaders’
autonomy through formal mechanisms for rank and ﬁle to hold leaders
accountable (see Wills-Otero 2009, 132–33). Routinization as deﬁned here
does not require vertical accountability mechanisms between followers
and leaders. Base-level routinization is likely to shape the behavior of
leaders, if leaders themselves are recruited from the party base. The two
aspects are assumed to go together in the classical mass party model (e.g.,
Panebianco 1988). Yet various studies have indicated that outsider re-
cruitment as well as high leadership autonomy or ﬂuidity can coexist with
a routinized party base (Kitschelt 1994; Levitsky 1998; Wills-Otero 2009).
4. While Panebianco has stressed the incompatibility between charis-
matic leadership and institutionalization, he presents strong institutionali-
zation as the second most likely outcome of a charismatic leader’s departure,
with weak institutionalization being the least likely outcome (1988, 161–62).mental attachments and thus a diffuse loyalty to the orga-
nization independent of the ongoing provision of material
beneﬁts or career advancements (Panebianco 1988, 10–11; Ran-
dall and Svåsand 2002, 10).
To sum up, routinization and value infusion capture qual-
itatively distinct phenomena, reﬂecting Randall and Svå-
sand’s (2002) insightful distinction between structural and atti-
tudinal institutionalization that do not necessarily coincide
(see ﬁg. 1).
Reviewing recent studies, purely structural institution-
alization is indeed widespread in very young democracies
(Svåsand 2013, 265), while new parties formed by individual
entrepreneurs in old democracies often routinize internal
processes with little interest in value infusion (Bolleyer 2013,
215–17). Similarly, not only Latin American parties but also
parties in central eastern Europe have created informal branch
structures, without cultivating a committedmembership (Freid-
enberg and Levitsky 2006, 179; van Biezen 2005, 155–56).THEORIZING ELITE INVESTMENTS IN
PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION
What are the conditions under which party elites are likely
to invest in routinization or value infusion? We distinguish
three sets of factors that create incentives toward building
an institutionalized relationship with followers, each derived
from the party’s position in a core arena of party activity—
party system, state, and society. All factors theorized belowFigure 1. Conﬁgurations of party institutionalization. Based on Randall and
Svåsand (2002).Thus, if a “charismatic party” can outlive its leader, attachments to this past
leader can strengthen followers’ loyalty and value infusion.
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ular region, assuring our framework’s broader applicability.The nature of party systems and
party institutionalization
Polarization, the ideological distances between parties, and
fragmentation, the number of parties that compete, are two
constitutive features of party systems (e.g., Sartori 1976). As
each of these two features has repercussions for the nature of
competition between parties, we can expect them to inﬂuence
elite choices whether to invest in PI or not.
Starting with polarization, the broadening of a party’s pro-
grammatic proﬁle—or in Lupu’s (2013) words the dilution of
its brand—can facilitate the mobilization of a diverse range
of followers. From this perspective, parties’ attempts to cre-
ate stable and permanent connections to clearly demarcated
groups through PI seem counterproductive (Gunther and
Hopkin 2009, 214; Lupu and Riedl 2013, 1349). However,
considering a polarized party system in which ideological dif-
ferences between parties are pronounced, citizens are more
likely to recognize those differences and, in turn, to form
stable party attachments (see LeBas 2011; Lupu 2015, 334–35).
In such a context, attempts on behalf of elites to generate
stable attachments by appealing to long-term partisan loyal-
ties (value infusion) are less costly and more likely to pay off
as compared to systems where ideological differences be-
tween parties are smaller and less visible (and “catchall strate-
gies” are thus more beneﬁcial). Consequently, elites’ incentives
to foster followers’ durable emotional afﬁliation should grow
with the polarization of the party system in which they are
embedded.
H1 (Polarization Hypothesis). The more polarized a
party system is, the more likely party elites invest in
value infusion.
Moving to party system fragmentation, as the number of po-
litical parties in a party system rises, it becomes increasingly
costly for voters to gather sufﬁcient information to assess the
record of incumbents and the promises of potential chal-
lengers (e.g., Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Schleiter and Voz-
naya 2014). Under such conditions, parties face higher pres-
sure to try to cultivate distinctive party labels able to underpin
stable commitments of clearly deﬁned groups of followers
(Hanson 2010; LeBas 2011; Lupu 2015), which, in turn, sup-
ports value infusion. More importantly, as presenting distinct
policy packages or identities becomes, ceteris paribus, more
difﬁcult in increasingly fragmented party systems, invest-ments in an infrastructure stabilizing ties to followers (Kit-
schelt and Kselman 2010, 13–14), that is, routinization, be-
comes increasingly valuable.
H2 (Fragmentation Hypothesis). The more fragmented
a party system is, the more likely party elites invest in
routinization and value infusion.
Party-state relations and patterns
of party institutionalization
Problems of resource scarcity are bound to complicate
party building in new democracies, where parties—after
transition—were suddenly confronted with the pressure to
run democratic elections and win over volatile electorates.
Consequently, direct and indirect access to state resources
should strengthen parties’ capacity to build institutional-
ized parties (see Casas-Zamora 2005; Grzymala-Busse 2002;
Molenaar 2012).
Startingwith direct state funding, permanent state subsidies
received directly by the party organization (rather than elec-
toral subsidies received by individual candidates) should in-
crease the capacity of elites to build a routinized infrastructure
including party ofﬁcials who “establish routines and standard
operating procedures” (Kitschelt 1994, 222), socializing fol-
lowers into party rules. We do not expect a link between per-
manent subsidies and value infusion as disposing of money or
other material resources itself is not enough for parties to in-
centivize citizens’ emotional afﬁliation to them (Levitsky et al.
2016). The same rationale applies to the link between insti-
tutionalization and legislative ofﬁce providing access to indi-
rect state funding. Parliamentary representatives receive for-
mal support, for example, through access to professional and
technical staff (Morgenstern, Negri, and Pérez-Liñán 2008,
174). Although usually reserved for “parliamentary usage,”
parties still beneﬁt from those resources (Bolleyer and Gauja
2015; Carey 2003, 31–33). As they multiply with a party’s size
in the legislature, investments in routinization should become
easier the stronger the party’s position in the legislature.
H3 (Permanent State Subsidies Hypothesis). If a party
has access to permanent state subsidies, party elites are
more likely to invest in routinization.
H4 (Legislative Ofﬁce Hypothesis). The bigger a legis-
lative party is, the more likely party elites invest in rou-
tinization.
Finally, taking over the core executive ofﬁce in a regime
should increase a party’s capacity to build a routinized party.
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to establish links to recipients of resources, helping to develop
routinized exchanges between these parties and their fol-
lowers (Kitschelt 1994; Kopecký, Mair, and Spirova 2012;
Stokes 2007).5 We further expect a link between executive
ofﬁce and value infusion. While permanent party subsidies
and parliamentary seats tend to be accessed by the large ma-
jority of parties including minor ones (Casas-Zamora 2005),
parties holding the core executive ofﬁce such as the presi-
dency tend to be major players in their party systems. Such
players need to gather and sustain support across a wide range
of relatively diverse constituencies. This positively incentivizes
the cultivation of long-term loyalties through the provision of
nonmaterial collective incentives rather than the sole reliance
on selective incentives such as patronage that are most effective
when targeting speciﬁc groups (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007;
Stokes 2007). In conjunction, occupants of core executive ofﬁces
enjoy superior visibility, which puts them in a particularly
suitable position to present themselves as a major identiﬁ-
cation ﬁgure to followers (Samuels 2002; Weisberg 2002, 342),
an advantage supportive of value infusion.
H5 (Executive Ofﬁce Hypothesis). The longer a party
holds the core executive ofﬁce in a regime, the more
likely party elites invest in routinization and in value
infusion.
While up to now we have theorized party-state relations
considering the opportunity structures of parties’ current re-
gime, parties often emerged in settings different from the one
they currently operate in. The nature of this formative en-
vironment is likely to leave its “genetic imprint” on parties’
characteristics in the longer term (Panebianco 1988, 49–50;
Randall and Svåsand 2002, 17–18; Riedl 2016; Slater and Wong
2013). Parties formed in authoritarian, thus less competitive,
settings ﬁnd it easier to build stable attachments and establish
a distinctive brand than parties formed in fully democratized
settings facing stiff competition from not only numerous new
but also already established parties (Loxton 2015, 160–61;
Randall and Svåsand 2002, 18). This suggests that the former5. Studies show that particularistic exchange relationships between
parties and followers tend to be based on rule-guided and regularized
behavior. The distributive efﬁciency of patronage-based parties depends
on their capacity to gather information about the responsiveness of po-
tential clients to selective beneﬁts and their commitment to support the
party even in the absence of formal sanctions (Stokes 2007, 610–15). To
overcome these problems parties invest in dense networks of local
intermediaries (brokers) who identify and monitor potential clients over
time and build long-term reciprocity-based relationships with them (see,
e.g., Schaffer and Schedler 2007).ﬁnd it easier to generate value infusion than parties formed
after the transition. Furthermore, parties formed in author-
itarian settings that managed to survive transition have been
ascribed a competitive advantage thanks to “inherited” re-
sources, such as territorial organizations or informal local net-
works, that facilitate routinization after transition (Frantz and
Geddes 2016; Loxton 2015, 161–62). More speciﬁcally, for-
merly ruling parties and those antiregime parties that used
violence under authoritarianism face enhanced pressures to
legitimize themselves in newly democratized regimes through
forming close ties to society (de Zeeuw 2010; Grzymala-Busse
2002, 69–70; Holland 2016; Tavits 2013). Investments in rou-
tinized relationships to followers are one strategy to do so.
H6 (Formative Environment Hypothesis). A party formed
in an authoritarian context is more likely to invest in
routinization and value infusion.
Party-society relations and patterns
of party institutionalization
Despite the importance of parties’ relationships with the state,
the support of societal groups can be an important founda-
tion for still ﬂuid party organizations to consolidate. Com-
pared to old democracies, in Asia, Latin America, Africa, or
central eastern Europe, ties to religious or ethnic groups have
had importance similar to class-based ties to unions (Main-
waring and Scully 2003; Randall and Svåsand 2002; Van Cott
2007). Ties to these three types of groups provide a partic-
ularly fruitful foundation for PI because these groups often
tend to provide widespread local infrastructures and a pool
of followers used to operate in organizational, rule-based set-
tings, both supportive of routinization. Simultaneously, these
groups pursue a strategy of social incorporation and cultivate
strong, encompassing group identities—supportive of value
infusion—from which individuals can exit only a very high
cost (e.g., LeBas 2011).
H7 (Group Ties Hypothesis). A party with strong ties
to a union, ethnic, or religious group is more likely to
invest in routinization and value infusion.
DATA, MEASUREMENT, AND MODEL CHOICE
The following analysis draws on a cross-sectional data set
that combines expert ratings on political parties’ organizational
characteristics and linkage strategies in 2009 with electoral
statistics and data on chief executives from 1978 to 2008 in
18 Latin American democracies. We consider our approach
applicable to democratic regimes that have been stable for a
certain period of time and repeatedly experienced competitive
elections, as in those regimes parties are exposed to the com-
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underlies several of the hypotheses in our framework. The Latin
American regimes covered in our empirical application are
suitable cases because they meet this condition: all countries
experienced at least four democratic elections since transition
and each has an average (polity2) democracy score of 5 or
higher during the 10 years prior to this study (see Mainwaring
and Pérez-Liñán 2013; Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2013).
Moreover, the Latin American region shares a similar history of
economic development compared to other world regions (see,
e.g., Bértoa and Ocampo 2012). This relative unit homogeneity
is advantageous since it allows us to concentrate on the ex-
planatory variables in our framework, while providing crucial
variation in the latter to test our hypotheses. Our analysis
includes all legislative parties covered in the DALP data set
(Kitschelt et al. 2009), which—considering our purposes—has
various advantages over alternative data sources, including a
(comparatively) broad coverage of parties, leading to a sample
of 88 political parties across 18 countries.6
Operationalization of party institutionalization
The DALP survey allows us to capture directly whether
party elites invest in structures and practices that are closely
associated with routinization and value infusion, respec-
tively, which provides us with suitable proxies to measure
each dimension empirically.7
In line with the conceptualization of base-level routini-
zation as structural institutionalization detailed earlier, we
combine two items in the DALP survey as a proxy for its
presence: the establishment of permanent local party ofﬁces
(item A1) and the existence of parties’ local intermediaries
(item A3), which avoids a bias in favor of a formal orga-
nization (Kitschelt and Kselman 2010; Levitsky 1998). The
routinization index is constructed as follows: ﬁrst, each
indicator is normalized between zero and one, with higher
values indicating higher levels of routinization. Second, we
calculate mean expert ratings per party for each indicator.
Third, we use an additive aggregation rule (i.e., the mean of
both proxies), assuming each indicator measures one aspect
of the dimension captured.
We measure value infusion through the appeal of party
elites to long-term partisan loyalty invoking the party’s his-
torical origins or achievements of historical leaders, or ref-6. We provide additional information on the data set and its advan-
tages, question wording, as well as a list of countries and parties in the
supplementary material. For more details on the survey, see https://web
.duke.edu/democracy.
7. See ﬁgs. A1 and A2 (available online) for more details on our mea-
sures of the dependent variables.erences to party symbols and rituals (item E4). This indicator
directly taps into Panebianco’s argument that party identiﬁ-
cation and solidarity between followers (reinforced by shared
symbols and rituals) are primary sources of collective incen-
tives central to generate value infusion (1988, 10–11; see also
Wilson 1973). It also reﬂects the importance of past leaders
as identiﬁcation ﬁgures who (if a party could outlive them) can
serve as important sources of followers’ long-term attachment
(Rosenblatt 2013). We normalize the item to range from zero
to one, with higher values indicating higher levels of value in-
fusion, and calculate the mean expert ratings per party. Fig-
ure 2 provides a graphical overview.
Considering the face validity of our measures, among the
parties that are strongly institutionalized on both dimensions
are the Brazilian Workers Party (PT), the Paraguayan Colo-
rado Party (ANR), and the Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) in Mexico, echoing earlier qualitative studies. Interest-
ingly, the Peronist Party (PJ) in Argentina—Levitsky’s (1998)
case of attitudinal PI—ranks highly on routinization. This goes
back to, on the one hand, the inclusion of informal structures
into our measurement and, on the other, our focus on base-
level routinization.8 Levitsky considered the PJ as weak on
“formal routinization” with outsider recruitments being com-
mon and leaders enjoying wide discretion (1998, 2001b). At
the same time, he characterized base-level Peronist activity as
informally routinized “to an important degree,” with activity
in local units being “rooted in widely shared norms” and Pero-
nist practices “widely known and remarkably similar across
territorial units” (1998, 87; 2001b). This not only substantiates
“our” location of the PJ with respect to base-level routiniza-
tion but also underlines the appropriateness of our decision to
include both formal party structures and informal networks
into our measure. It also explains why the category of (rela-
tively) strongly institutionalized parties includes state-centered
party machines such as the Colorado Party (ANR), labor-based
patronage parties such as the Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI), and programmatic mass parties such as the Brazilian
Workers Party (PT). Our operationalization avoids dismissing
any party distinct from the classical “mass party model” as
weakly institutionalized.
Returning to the broader picture, most parties are strong
or weak on both routinization and value infusion, indicated
by a correlation coefﬁcient of .74 (p ! .000) between the two
dimensions. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd some routinized parties that
do not foster value infusion in the same way as they foster
routinization (i.e., structurally institutionalized parties) such as8. Note that at the time of the survey two factions of the Peronist Party
competed against each other, the Federal Peronists (PJ in ﬁg. 2) and the Front
for Victory (FPV in ﬁg. 2), of which the FPV is less institutionalized.
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Movement (MVR) in Venezuela, of which the latter is cur-
rently trying to outlive the death of its charismatic leader,
Hugo Chavez (see, e.g., Hawkins 2010; Roberts 2003). The
personalistic Alliance for the Future (APF) in Peru and the
Nationalist Republican Liberal Movement (MOLIR) in Pan-
ama, in contrast, fall in the quadrant of attitudinally institu-
tionalized parties.
Operationalization of the explanatory variables
Since our analyses are based on cross-sectional data, we can
examine whether and how the conditions theorized in our
hypotheses are related to different patterns of PI but we can-
not test the causal relationships between them. We partially
account for these data limits through the time structure of our
data. Reﬂecting our theoretical rationale, we lag the measures
of our independent variables by using data from before 2009
(the year of the DALP survey) as far as possible.9 Descriptive
statistics are provided in the supplementary material.
Wemeasure party system polarization (hypothesis 1) using
the Taylor-Herman index (Taylor and Herman 1971) calcu-
lated on the basis of itemD6 in the DALP data, which captures9. The party system polarization and the group ties measure rely on
the DALP data set. Thus these variables could not be lagged.political parties’ left-right placements, and parties’ seat shares
in the national legislature. Party system fragmentation (hy-
pothesis 2) is measured on the basis of seat shares capturing
the effective number of parliamentary parties (Laakso and
Taagepera 1979). We calculate the index for each election
between 1999 and 2008 and then take the mean for each
country, to control for sudden changes in party systems. We
measure permanent state subsidies (hypothesis 3) capturing the
number of years a political party has received permanent
organizational funding prior to the survey based on data
provided by Molenaar (2012, 13, 28). We use the logged vari-
able to account for decreasing returns for each year after
funding was introduced. To test hypothesis 4 (legislative of-
ﬁce) we use parties’ parliamentary strength based on the seat
share parties held prior to the survey.10 We measure the time
period duringwhich a party held executive ofﬁce (hypothesis 5)
by coding the number of years the party held the presidency
since 1980 or the latest return to democratic rule.11 We again
use the logged variable to account for decreasing returns for
each year the party held the presidency. Formation environ-
ment (hypothesis 6) captures the regime type in the ﬁrst ﬁveFigure 2. Party institutionalization in Latin America. Calculations based on DALP. See ﬁgure A3 for country patterns and table A3 for party acronyms, both
available in the supplementary material.10. Data for the distribution of seats are provided online by most
countries; detailed resources are available on request from the authors.
11. Data on presidents and their parties stem from Ruth (2016).
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of the polity2 item in the Polity IV data set. The item captures
the regime type of a country ranging from 210 (strongly au-
tocratic) to110 (strongly democratic;Marshall et al. 2013).We
inverse and normalize the variable to run from zero (strongly
democratic) to one (strongly autocratic) to mirror the di-
rection of our hypothesis. Finally, we capture a party’s group
ties (hypothesis 7) based on DALP item A8, which asks
experts to indicate themost relevant civil society organization
a political party is strongly linked to. We use the percentage of
experts positively identifying either unions, ethnic, or religious
groups as themost relevant civil society organization the party
is linked to. The variable, hence, ranges from zero (no group
ties) to one (strong group ties). Finally, we include logged party
age as a control variable covering the years from the party’s
foundation up to 2008.
Model choice
To analyze the relationship between our explanatory variables
and the two dimensions of PI, we estimate multivariate or-
dinary least squares (OLS) regression models with standard
errors clustered by country, to account for the nestedness of
political parties within countries and the heteroscedasticity
in the error term (see Gelman and Hill 2007).12
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 1 reports the results for both dependent variables, rou-
tinization (model 1) and value infusion (model 2). Concerning
goodness of ﬁt, both models perform very well. Model 1 ex-
plains about 73% of the variance of routinization. Model 2
captures about 63% of the variance of value infusion.
All coefﬁcients have the theoretically expected signs. Three
variables—executive ofﬁce, formation environment, and group
ties—are signiﬁcantly associated with both dependent vari-
ables. However, three—party system fragmentation, perma-
nent state subsidies, and legislative ofﬁce—signiﬁcantly relate
only to routinization. Party system polarization relates only to
value infusion. All effects reported below are signiﬁcant at the
95% conﬁdence level or higher and hold controlling for party
age. In the following sections, we discuss these ﬁndings grouped
along the three sets of factors theorized as relevant to party
building.1312. We estimate linear hierarchical models as an alternative. The basic
ﬁndings stay the same with only slight changes in the level of signiﬁcance of
some variables (see table A4 in the supplementary material).
13. To check the robustness of our ﬁndings we ran additional model
speciﬁcations with several country-level control variables; none of these var-
iables had signiﬁcant effects on our two dependent variables (for details see
table A8 in the supplementary material).Elite investments in institutionalized
political parties
Considering conditions linked to a party’s embeddedness in its
party system, polarization (hypothesis 1) is positively related
only to value infusion, while a party’s operation in a frag-
mented party system (hypothesis 2) is associated with rou-
tinization (see ﬁg. 3). In increasingly polarized systems, ideo-
logical differences between parties become more pronounced,
and citizens are more likely to recognize interparty differences
and, in turn, are more likely to form stable party attachments
(Lupu 2015, 334–35). Parties are therefore incentivized not
only to invest in the distinctiveness of the offer within their
party system but also to increase the potential identiﬁcation of
their voters with the party’s ideological position or the group
identity they address, thereby enhancing value infusion (Bar-
tolini 2000; Lupu 2013). The coefﬁcient is highly signiﬁcant
at the 99.9% conﬁdence level. Figure 3A shows that value in-
fusion is more than 0.10 points lower for parties in a party
system with very low polarization (e.g., Honduras) compared
to parties in a party system with high polarization (e.g., El
Salvador).
Party system fragmentation (hypothesis 2), in contrast, is
positively related toparty routinization (p! .001).One rationale
for the differentiated impact of fragmentation is provided by
Epstein (2009), who argues—referring to the Brazilian mul-
tiparty system—that high fragmentation complicates the dis-
tinguishability of programmatic party platforms, especially if
the party system is also prone to clientelistic behavior, as many
LatinAmericanparty systems are. In such contexts, the building
of long-term loyalties is very demanding, which might incen-
tivize elites to invest in party routinization instead. As shown
in ﬁgure 3B, routinization increases from 0.54 in party systems
with an effective number of parties of two to 0.75 in a party
system with eight “effective parties.”
Moving to party-state relations, as theoretically expected,
permanent party subsidies (hypothesis 3), access to legislative
ofﬁce (hypothesis 4), and executive ofﬁce (hypothesis 5) are
signiﬁcantly related to routinization.14 The longer political
parties beneﬁt from permanent state subsidies (hypothesis 3),
the more they tend to be routinized. Similarly, the access of a14. We ran three additional model speciﬁcations to examine the robust-
ness of our arguments regarding access to state resources (hypotheses 3–5).
First, we added a control variable capturing the overall dependency of parties
on state resources. Second, we added a variable controlling for participation
in government coalitions. Finally, we controlled for single-party dominance
(Greene 2007). All results indicate that our results are very reliable. None of our
main ﬁndings lose signiﬁcance, and their effects remain remarkably robust in
both size and direction. Details are provided in table A5 in the supplementary
material.
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atively large effect on routinization (see the standardized co-
efﬁcients reported in table 1). Routinization increases from
0.55 for a party with a legislative seat share of 10% to 0.78 for
a party with 40% of the legislative seats (see ﬁg. 4A). While
both the availability of permanent subsidies and legislative of-
ﬁce facilitate routinization, they do not support the genera-
tion of noninstrumental attachments of followers; that is, we
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship with value infusion.
In contrast, parties with access to the presidency as the core
executive ofﬁce are characterized by higher levels of both rou-
tinization and value infusion, in line with our executive ofﬁcehypothesis. The presidency provides parties with a compara-
tive resource advantage, facilitating the capital-intensive for-
mation of permanent party structures supporting routini-
zation. One unit increase in executive ofﬁce access (logged
years) leads to a 0.05 point (p ! .001) increase in party rou-
tinization. Regarding value infusion, presidential parties—as
major players—face incentives to maintain partisan loyalties
across a broad range of supporters through the provision of
nonmaterial collective incentives conducive to value infusion,
rather than to rely solely on selective incentives such as pa-
tronage that are most effective when targeting speciﬁc groups




CoefﬁcientPolarization (hypothesis 1) .01 .02 .01*** .03***(.00) (.01) (.00) (.01)Fragmentation (hypothesis 2) .03*** .06*** 2.01 2.02(.00) (.01) (.01) (.01)Permanent state subsidies (hypothesis 3) .03* .03* .01 .02(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)Legislative ofﬁce (hypothesis 4) .01*** .12*** .00 .03(.00) (.02) (.00) (.02)Executive ofﬁce (hypothesis 5) .05*** .06*** .06* .06*(.01) (.01) (.02) (.03)Formation environment (hypothesis 6) .15* .05* .18** .05**(.05) (.02) (.06) (.02)Group ties (hypothesis 7) .15* .04* .16* .04*(.05) (.01) (.07) (.02)Party age (log) .03* .03* .06** .07**(.01) (.02) (.02) (.02)Constant .02 .62*** .21* .64***(.05) (.01) (.08) (.01)Adjusted R2 .73 .63F 5.36*** 45.20***Note. Unstandardized (b) and standardized coefﬁcients are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered
by country). N p 88.
1 p ! .10.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.
*** p ! .001.
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executive ofﬁce, these parties can effectively increase the value
of their party label for rank-and-ﬁle members (Hicken and
Stoll 2011; Samuels 2002; Weisberg 2002). One unit increasein executive ofﬁce access (logged years) leads to a 0.07 point
(p ! .05) increase in value infusion (see ﬁg. 4B).
On the basis of our cross-sectional analyses, it is difﬁcult
to rule out reverse causation. While in new democracies accessFigure 3. Predictive margins of party system characteristics (95% conﬁdence intervals)Figure 4. Predictive margins of access to legislative and executive ofﬁce (95% conﬁdence intervals)
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scarcity in the process of party building (Levitsky et al. 2016),
PI might also help a party to access presidential ofﬁce and
lead to a stronger representation in the legislature. To ex-
amine whether success in executive and legislative elections
is affected by either one or both of our two dimensions of PI,
we performed additional robustness checks by regressing a
party’s degree of routinization and value infusion (at t1) on
its success in the next legislative and the next presidential
election after 2008 (at t2), respectively. The results suggest that
reverse causation does not drive the relationship between PI
and winning executive or legislative ofﬁce. We do not ﬁnd any
signiﬁcant association between routinization (at t1) or value
infusion (at t1) and the share of seats a political party is able
to win in the next legislative election (at t2) or the probability
of winning the next presidential election (at t2).15 These ﬁnd-
ings echo earlier work that highlights that access to presiden-
tial ofﬁce does not require presidential candidates to rely on
a strong party organization, as the frequent election of political
outsiders (Levitsky and Loxton 2013) and the dominance of
highly personalized and media-based electoral campaigning
illustrate (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007).
Having considered the implications of opportunity struc-
tures available to parties in their current regime, we now move15. Detailed information on these endogeneity checks can be found in
tables A6 and A7 in the supplementary material.to the implications of their formation environment (hypothe-
sis 6), which is positively associated with routinization and
value infusion alike. The link to routinization echoes studies
stressing the importance of “inherited” resources in terms of
territorial organization or informal local networks from which
formerly ruling successors as well as their repressed counter-
parts proﬁt (de Zeeuw 2010; Frantz and Geddes 2016; Loxton
2015, 161–62). Routinization increases from 0.57 for parties
formed under a strongly democratic regime to 0.72 for parties
formed under a strongly autocratic regime. Moving to value
infusion, our results indicate that value infusion increases
from 0.57 for parties formed under a strongly democratic re-
gime to 0.75 for parties formed under a strongly autocratic
regime. As authoritarian settings are less competitive, parties
ﬁnd it easier to build stable attachments and establish a dis-
tinctive brand than parties formed in fully democratized set-
tings facing stiff competition (Loxton 2015, 160–61; Randall
and Svåsand 2002, 18).
Concluding with the implications of a party’s societal rela-
tions, ties to unions, ethnic, or religious groups (group ties,
hypothesis 7) are conducive to both dimensions of PI. Parties
with strong group ties are, on average, 0.15 points more rou-
tinized compared to parties without such ties (see ﬁg. 5A). To
uphold these alliances and secure a long-term electoral sup-
port base, party elites face strong incentives to invest in per-
manent party structures to coordinate their interaction with
these groups, which simultaneously bring resources with themFigure 5. Predictive margins of group ties (95% conﬁdence intervals)
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tion. Also, parties with strong ties to unions, ethnic, or reli-
gious groups are more likely to invest in value infusion than
those without. For the former, value infusion is, on average,
0.15 points higher (see ﬁg. 5B). As Collier and Collier (1991)
showed, several political parties in Latin America established
“stable, institutionalized alliances” with labor unions. A sim-
ilar stabilizing role was played by ethnic movements (Madrid
2005; Van Cott 2007) and religious associations (see Main-
waring and Scully 2003). Simultaneously, these groups culti-
vate strong and encompassing group identities supportive to
value infusion from which individuals can exit only at very
high costs (e.g., LeBas 2011).
To sum up, our ﬁndings highlight that distinguishing be-
tween routinization and value infusion is not only conceptually
persuasive but empirically important to account for patterns
of party development: all factors theorized in our framework
played a role, but the majority (four of seven) affected only
either routinization or value infusion. Two of the three factors
having signiﬁcant effects on both dimensions fall in the sphere
of party-state relations, and the third falls in the sphere of
party-society relations. In contrast, the two party system char-
acteristics each associate strongly with only one of the two
dimensions:polarizationisassociatedwithvalueinfusiononly,
while fragmentation is associated only with routinization. Con-
sidering which sphere—party system, state, and society—is
particularly relevant for each dimension of PI, routinization
is related particularly strongly to the nature of party-state
relations: four of six variables that are signiﬁcant fall in that an-
alytical category; that is, all four of our hypotheses on the link
between party-state relations and routinization hold. The pic-
ture regarding value infusion is more complex: while again two
signiﬁcant conditions are associated with parties’ current or
past relationship to the state, the remaining two are linked to
parties’ relations with society (group ties) and their party sys-
tem (polarization).
CONCLUSION
Building institutionalized parties is a demanding process, es-
pecially in new democracies (Casal Bértoa 2016; Levitsky 1998;
Randall and Svåsand 2002; van Biezen 2005). To account for
the diversity of PI in new democracies, we theorized conditions
incentivizing party elites to invest in institutionalized rela-
tionships to followers in contexts that are commonly consid-
ered unfavorable to extra-parliamentary party building (e.g.,
Levitsky et al. 2016; Svåsand 2013; van Biezen 2003). Drawing
on literatures on party development from various regions, we
identiﬁed such conditions across three central spheres of party
activity: irrespective of the type of democracy they operate in,
parties compete with each other in the electoral market, theyaccess (if they can) state institutions, and (to different degrees
and in different ways) they are linked to society. Substantiat-
ing our decision against a more parsimonious approach, we
found that in new democracies—represented by those in the
Latin American region—routinization and value infusion were
signiﬁcantly associated with conditions located in all three
spheres. Simultaneously, our ﬁndings revealed variegated rela-
tionships between explanatory factors located in each sphere
and each of the two dimensions of PI. Consequently, the con-
ceptual distinction between qualitatively different dimensions
of PI (Levitsky 1998; Randall and Svåsand 2002) is indeed em-
pirically relevant.
Exploring the conditions that incentivize party elites in
new democracies to build institutionalized parties is impor-
tant. The latter provide structures allowing citizens to be in-
volved in politics between elections and thereby form long-
term attachments rather than solely engaging in politics for
instrumental reasons (e.g., to receive material beneﬁts through
clientelistic party networks). Value infusion can help counter
antiparty sentiments and alienation from politics that are wide-
spread among citizens in Latin American democracies (see
Payne 2006), strengthening the legitimacy of a democratic
regime. Simultaneously, routinized relationships with follow-
ers provide channels of communication between citizens and
elites, a core element to assure the electoral accountability of
representatives (e.g., Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006; Randall
and Svåsand 2002). By systematically assessing under which
conditions parties institutionalize structurally or attitudinally,
we thus not only address an important theoretical and empirical
gap as large-N studies so far have not distinguished these two
dimensions. We also contribute to important debates on the
quality of democracy and the contribution the nature of in-
dividual parties is likely to make to the consolidation of new
democracies (Diamond and Gunther 2001; Diamond and Mor-
lino 2005).
A central challenge for future research will be the assess-
ment of the actual effects of different dimensions of PI, which
we disentangled conceptually and empirically, on the demo-
cratic process. PI is often considered as beneﬁcial for democ-
racy (Huntington 1968; Mainwaring and Scully 1995), yet it
remains unclear whether (too) strongly institutionalized par-
ties might not have negative effects as well (e.g., Casal Bértoa
2016; Hicken and Martinez Kuhonta 2011). Similarly, if rou-
tinization and value infusion vary in strength within the same
party, we face the challenge to theorize separately the effects
of each dimension on party system institutionalization and,
more broadly, on democracy. Research has stressed that a
permanent local organization can be an important tool for
clientelistic parties to allocate selective incentives (Levitsky
2001a; Stokes 2007). And, as indicated by our mapping of
300 / Elite Investments in Party Institutionalization Nicole Bolleyer and Saskia P. Ruthinstitutionalization patterns (ﬁg. 2), some parties routinize
without cultivating an emotional attachment of followers to
the party and, with it, possibly to the regime that the party
represents. Functional linkages underpinned by routinized
party structures might support the persistence of parties, which,
in turn, might stabilize party competition. Yet the effects of
routinization are not equivalent to effects that can be ex-
pected from value infusion in terms of generating citizens’
support and attachment to political parties that is not instru-
mentally driven. This, in turn, suggests that once we move
toward understanding the contexts in which different modes
of party formation and development are likely to occur, we
might be able to tackle an even bigger challenge—to under-
stand the latter’s consequences for democracy.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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